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AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. ET AL. _v_. ITALIAN COLORS RESTAURANT ET AL.

[**2306] No. 12-133. Argued February 27, 2013-Decided June 20, 2013

An agreement between petitioners, American Express and a subsidiary, and respondents, merchants who accept American Express cards, requires all of their disputes to be resolved by arbitration and provides that there "shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis." Respondents nonetheless filed a class action, claiming that petitioners violated Sherman Act §1 and seeking treble damages for the class under § 4 of the Clayton Act. Petitioners moved to compel individual arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), but respondents countered that the cost of expert analysis necessary to prove the antitrust claims would greatly exceed the maximum recovery for an individual plaintiff. The District Court granted the motion and dismissed the lawsuits. The Second Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that because of the prohibitive costs respondents would face if they had to arbitrate, the class-action waiver was unenforceable and arbitration could not proceed. The Circuit stood by its reversal when this Court remanded in light of Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 559 U.S. 662 , which held that a party may not be compelled to submit to class arbitration absent an agreement to do so.

_Held_: The FAA does not permit courts to invalidate a contractual waiver of class arbitration on the ground that the plaintiff's cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery. Pp. 3-10.

(a) The FAA reflects the overarching principle that arbitration is a matter of contract. See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. ___, ___. Courts must "rigorously enforce" arbitration agreements according to their terms, Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 , 221, even for claims alleging a violation of a federal statute, unless the FAA's mandate has been "'overridden by a contrary congressional command,'" CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. ___, ___. Pp. 3-4.

(b) No contrary congressional command requires rejection of the class-arbitration waiver here. The antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of [***422] every claim, see Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522 , 525-526, or "evince an intention to [*229] preclude a waiver" of class-action procedure, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 , 628. Nor does congressional approval [**2307] of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 establish an entitlement to class proceedings for the vindication of statutory rights. The Rule imposes stringent requirements for certification that exclude most claims, and this Court has rejected the assertion that the class-notice requirement must be dispensed with because the "prohibitively high cost" of compliance would "frustrate [plaintiff's] attempt to vindicate the policies underlying the antitrust" laws, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 , 167-168, 175-176. Pp. 4-5.

(c) The "effective vindication" exception that originated as dictum in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 , also does not invalidate the instant arbitration agreement. The exception comes from a desire to prevent "prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies," [****2] _id.,_ at 637, n. 19; but the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in _proving_ a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the _right to pursue_ that remedy. Cf. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 , 32; Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S. A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 , 530, 534. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. ___, all but resolves this case. There, in finding that a law that conditioned enforcement of arbitration on the availability of class procedure interfered with fundamental arbitration attributes, _id.,_ at ___, the Court specifically rejected the argument that class arbitration was necessary to prosecute claims "that might otherwise slip through the legal system," _id.,_ at ___. Pp. 5-9.

667 F. 3d 204 , reversed.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. [*230]

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

We consider whether a contractual waiver of class arbitration is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act when the plaintiff 's cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery. [**2308]

Respondents are merchants who accept American Express cards. Their [***423] agreement with petitioners-American Express and a wholly owned subsidiary-contains a clause that requires all disputes between the parties to be resolved by arbitration. The agreement also provides that "[t]here shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis." In re American Express Merchants' Litigation, 667 F. 3d 204 , 209 (CA2 2012).

Respondents brought a class action against petitioners for violations of the federal antitrust laws. According to respondents, American Express used its monopoly power in the market for charge cards to force merchants to accept credit cards at rates approximately 30% higher than the fees for competing credit cards._¹_ This tying arrangement, respondents said, violated Sherman Act§1 . They sought treble damages for the class under § 4 of the Clayton Act.

Petitioners moved to compel individual arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §1 _et seq._ In resisting the motion, respondents submitted a declaration from an economist who estimated that the cost of an expert analysis necessary to prove the antitrust claims would be "at least several hundred thousand dollars, and might exceed $1 million," while the maximum recovery for an individual plaintiff would be $12,850, or $38,549 when trebled. App. 93. The District Court granted the motion and dismissed [*232] the lawsuits. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings. It held that because respondents had established that "they would incur prohibitive costs if compelled to arbitrate under the class action waiver," the waiver was unenforceable and the arbitration could not proceed. In re American Express Merchants' Litigation, 554 F. 3d 300 , 315-316 (CA2 2009).

We granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded for further consideration in light of Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010), which held that a party may not be compelled to submit to class arbitration absent an agreement to do so. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 559 U.S. 1103 (2010). The Court of Appeals stood [****3] by its reversal, stating that its earlier ruling did not compel class arbitration. In re American Express Merchants' Litigation, 634 F. 3d 187 , 200 (CA2 2011). It then _sua sponte_ reconsidered its ruling in light of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. ___ (2011), which held that the FAA pre-empted a state law barring enforcement of a class-arbitration waiver. Finding _AT&T Mobility_ inapplicable because it addressed pre-emption, the Court of Appeals reversed for the third time. 667 F. 3d, at 213 . It then denied rehearing en banc with five judges dissenting. In re American Express Merchants' Litigation, 681 F. 3d 139 (CA2 2012). We granted certiorari, 568 U.S. ___ (2012), to consider the question "[w]hether the Federal Arbitration Act permits courts ... to invalidate arbitration agreements on the ground that they do not permit class arbitration of a federal-law claim," Pet. for Cert. i.

Congress enacted the FAA in [***424] response to widespread judicial hostility to [**2309] arbitration. See _AT&T Mobility, supra_ , at ___ (slip op., at 4). As relevant here, the Act provides:

  "A written provision in any maritime transaction or contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to [*233] settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."

  9 U.S.C. §2 .

This text reflects the overarching principle that arbitration is a matter of contract. See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. ___ , ___ (2010) (slip op., at 3). And consistent with that text, courts must "rigorously enforce" arbitration agreements according to their terms, Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 , 221 (1985), including terms that "specify _with whom_ [the parties] choose to arbitrate their disputes," _Stolt-Nielsen_, _supra_ , at 683 , and "the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted," Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 , 479 (1989). That holds true for claims that allege a violation of a federal statute, unless the FAA's mandate has been "'overridden by a contrary congressional command.'" CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. ___ , ___ (2012) (slip op., at 2-3) (quoting Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 , 226 (1987)).

No contrary congressional command requires us to reject the waiver of class arbitration here. Respondents argue that requiring them to litigate their claims individually-as they contracted to do-would contravene the policies of the antitrust laws. But the antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim. Congress has taken some measures to facilitate the litigation of antitrust claims-for example, it enacted a multiplied-damages remedy. See 15 U.S.C. §15 (treble damages). In enacting such measures, Congress has told us that it is willing to go, in certain respects, beyond the normal limits of law in advancing its goals of deterring and remedying unlawful trade practice. But to say that Congress must have intended [*234] whatever departures from those normal limits advance antitrust goals is simply irrational. "[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs." Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522 , 525-526 (1987) (_per curiam_).

The antitrust laws do not "evinc[e] an intention to preclude a waiver" of class-action procedure. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 , 628 (1985). The Sherman and Clayton Acts make no mention of class actions. In fact, they were enacted decades before the advent of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 , which was "[****4] designed to allow an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only." Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 , 700-701 (1979). The parties here agreed to arbitrate pursuant [***425] to that "usual rule," and it would be remarkable for a court to erase that expectation.

Nor does congressional approval of Rule 23 establish an entitlement to class proceedings for the vindication of statutory rights. To begin with, it is likely that such an entitlement, invalidating private arbitration agreements denying class adjudication, would be an "abridg[ment]" or [**2310] modif[ication]" of a "substantive right" forbidden to the Rules, see 28 U.S.C. §2072(b) . But there is no evidence of such an entitlement in any event. The Rule imposes stringent requirements for certification that in practice exclude most claims. And we have specifically rejected the assertion that one of those requirements (the class-notice requirement) must be dispensed with because the "prohibitively high cost" of compliance would "frustrate [plaintiff 's] attempt to vindicate the policies underlying the antitrust" laws. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 , 166-168 , 175-176 (1974). One might respond, perhaps, that federal law secures a nonwaivable _opportunity_ to vindicate federal policies by satisfying the procedural strictures of Rule 23 or invoking some other informal class mechanism in arbitration. But we have [*235] already rejected that proposition in _AT&T Mobility_, 563 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 9).

Our finding of no "contrary congressional command" does not end the case. Respondents invoke a judge-made exception to the FAA which, they say, serves to harmonize competing federal policies by allowing courts to invalidate agreements that prevent the "effective vindication" of a federal statutory right. Enforcing the waiver of class arbitration bars effective vindication, respondents contend, because they have no economic incentive to pursue their antitrust claims individually in arbitration.

The "effective vindication" exception to which respondents allude originated as dictum in _Mitsubishi Motors_, where we expressed a willingness to invalidate, on "public policy" grounds, arbitration agreements that "operat[e] ... as a prospective waiver of a party's _right to pursue_ statutory remedies." 473 U.S., at 637 , n. 19 (emphasis added). Dismissing concerns that the arbitral forum was inadequate, we said that "so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function." __Id., at 637 . Subsequent cases have similarly asserted the existence of an "effective vindication" exception, see, _e.g.,_ 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 , 273-274 (2009); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 , 28 (1991), but have similarly declined to apply it to invalidate the arbitration agreement at issue._²_

[*236] And we do so again here. As we have described, the exception finds [***426] its origin in the desire to prevent "prospective waiver of a party's _right to pursue_ statutory remedies," _Mitsubishi Motors_, _supra_ , at 637 , n. 19 (emphasis added). That would certainly cover a provision in an arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion [****5] of certain statutory rights. And it would perhaps cover filing and administrative fees attached to arbitration that are so high as to make access [**2311] to the forum impracticable. See Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 , 90 (2000) ("It may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant ... from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights"). But the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in _proving_ a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the _right to pursue_ that remedy. See 681 F. 3d, at 147 (Jacobs, C. J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)._³_ The class-action waiver merely limits arbitration to the two contracting parties. It no more eliminates those parties' right to pursue their statutory remedy than did federal law before its adoption of the class action for legal relief in 1938, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 , 28 U.S.C., p. 864 (1938 ed., Supp V); 7A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §1752, p. 18 (3d ed. 2005). Or, to put it differently, the individual suit that was considered adequate to assure "effective vindication" of a federal [*237] right before adoption of class-action procedures did not suddenly become "ineffective vindication" upon their adoption._⁴_

A pair of our cases brings home the point. In _Gilmer_, _supra_ , we had no qualms in enforcing a class waiver in an arbitration agreement even though the federal statute at issue, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, expressly permitted collective actions. We said that statutory permission did "'not mean that individual attempts at conciliation were intended to be barred.'" __Id., at 32 . [***427] And in Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S. A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995), we held that requiring arbitration in a foreign country was compatible with the federal Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. That legislation prohibited any agreement "'relieving'" or "'lessening'" the liability of a carrier for damaged goods, __id., at 530 , 534 (quoting 46 U.S.C. App. §1303(8) (1988 ed.))-which is close to codification of an "effective vindication" exception. The Court rejected the argument that the "inconvenience and costs of proceeding" abroad "lessen[ed]" the defendants' liability, stating that "[i]t would be unwieldy and unsupported by the terms or policy of the statute to require courts to [**2312] proceed case by case to tally the [*238] costs and burdens to particular plaintiffs in light of their means, the size of their claims, and the relative burden on the carrier." 515 U.S., at 532 , 536 . Such a "tally[ing] [of] the costs and burdens" is precisely what the dissent would impose upon federal courts here.

Truth to tell, our decision in _AT&T Mobility_ all but resolves this case. There we invalidated a law conditioning enforcement of arbitration on the availability of class procedure because that law "interfere[d] with fundamental attributes of arbitration." 563 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 9). "[T]he switch from bilateral to class arbitration," we said, "sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration-its informality-and makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment." __Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14). We specifically rejected the argument that class arbitration was [****6] necessary to prosecute claims "that might otherwise slip through the legal system." __Id., at ___ (slip op., at 17)._⁵_

* * *

The regime established by the Court of Appeals' decision would require-before a plaintiff can be held to contractually agreed bilateral arbitration-that a federal court determine (and the parties litigate) the legal requirements for success on the merits claim-by-claim and theory-by-theory, the evidence necessary to meet those requirements, the cost of developing [*239] that evidence, and the damages that would be recovered in the event of success. Such a preliminary litigating hurdle would undoubtedly destroy the prospect of speedy resolution that arbitration in general and bilateral arbitration in particular was meant to secure. The FAA does not sanction such a judicially created superstructure.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

_It is so ordered.[***428]_

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

JUSTICE KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG and JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting.

Here is the nutshell version of this case, unfortunately obscured in the Court's decision. The owner of a small restaurant (Italian Colors) thinks that American Express (Amex) has used its monopoly power to force merchants to accept a form contract violating the antitrust laws. The restaurateur wants to challenge the allegedly unlawful provision (imposing a tying arrangement), but the same contract's arbitration clause prevents him from doing so. That term imposes a variety of procedural bars that would make pursuit of the antitrust claim a fool's errand. So if the arbitration clause is enforceable, Amex has insulated itself from antitrust liability-even if it has in fact violated the law. The monopolist [****7] gets to use its monopoly power to insist on a contract effectively depriving its victims of all legal recourse.

And here is the nutshell version of today's opinion, admirably flaunted rather than camouflaged: Too darn bad.

That answer is a betrayal of our precedents, and of federal statutes like the antitrust laws. Our decisions have developed a mechanism-called the effective-vindication rule-to prevent arbitration clauses from choking off a plaintiff 's ability to enforce congressionally created rights. That doctrine bars applying such a clause when (but only when) it operates to confer immunity from potentially meritorious federal claims. In so doing, the rule reconciles the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) with all the rest [***429] of federal law-and indeed, promotes the most fundamental purposes of the FAA itself. As applied here, the rule would ensure that Amex's arbitration clause does not foreclose Italian Colors from vindicating its right to redress antitrust harm.

The majority barely tries to explain why it reaches a contrary result. It notes that we have not decided this exact case before-neglecting that the principle we have established fits this case hand in glove. And it concocts a special exemption for class-arbitration waivers-ignoring that this [*241] case concerns much more than that. Throughout, the majority disregards our decisions' central tenet: An arbitration clause may not thwart federal law, irrespective of exactly how it does so. Because the Court today prevents the effective vindication of federal statutory rights, I respectfully dissent.

Start with an uncontroversial proposition: We would refuse to enforce an exculpatory clause insulating a company from antitrust liability-say, "Merchants may bring no Sherman Act claims"-even if that clause were contained in an arbitration agreement. See _ante_, at 6. Congress created the Sherman Act's private cause of action not solely to compensate individuals, but to promote "the public interest in vigilant enforcement of the antitrust laws." Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322 , 329 (1955). Accordingly, courts will not enforce a prospective waiver [**2314] of the right to gain redress for an antitrust injury, whether in an arbitration agreement or any other contract. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 , 637 , and n. 19 (1985). The same rule applies to other important federal statutory rights. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 , 273 (2009) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 , 704 (1945) (Fair Labor Standards Act). But its necessity is nowhere more evident than in the antitrust context. Without the rule, a company could use its monopoly power to protect its monopoly power, by coercing agreement to contractual terms eliminating its antitrust liability.

If the rule were limited to baldly exculpatory provisions, however, a monopolist could devise numerous ways around it. Consider several alternatives that a party drafting an arbitration agreement could adopt to avoid antitrust liability, each of which would have the identical effect. On the front end: The agreement might set outlandish filing fees or establish [*242] an absurd (_e.g_., one-day) statute of limitations, thus preventing [****8] a claimant from gaining access to the arbitral forum. On the back end: The agreement might remove the arbitrator's authority to grant meaningful relief, so that a judgment gets the claimant nothing worthwhile. And in the middle: The agreement might block the claimant from presenting the kind of proof that is necessary to establish the defendant's liability-say, by prohibiting any economic testimony (good luck proving an antitrust claim without that!). Or else the agreement might appoint as an arbitrator an obviously biased person-say, the [***430] CEO of Amex. The possibilities are endless-all less direct than an express exculpatory clause, but no less fatal. So the rule against prospective waivers of federal rights can work only if it applies not just to a contract clause explicitly barring a claim, but to others that operate to do so.

And sure enough, our cases establish this proposition: An arbitration clause will not be enforced if it prevents the effective vindication of federal statutory rights, however it achieves that result. The rule originated in _Mitsubishi_, where we held that claims brought under the Sherman Act and other federal laws are generally subject to arbitration. 473 U.S., at 628 . By agreeing to arbitrate such a claim, we explained, "a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum." __Ibid. But crucial to our decision was a limiting principle, designed to safeguard federal rights: An arbitration clause will be enforced only "so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum." __Id., at 637 . If an arbitration provision "operated ... as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies," we emphasized, we would "condemn[]" it. __Id., at 637 , n. 19. Similarly, we stated that such a clause should be "set[] aside" if "proceedings in the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult" that the claimant "will for all practical [*243] purposes be deprived of his day in court." __Id., at 632 (internal quotation marks omitted). And in the decades since _Mitsubishi_, we have repeated its admonition time and again, instructing courts not to enforce an arbitration agreement that effectively (even if not explicitly) forecloses a plaintiff from remedying the violation of a federal statutory right. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 , 28 (1991); Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S. A. v. M/V Sky Reefer[**2315] , 515 U.S. 528 , 540 (1995); _14 Penn Plaza_, 556 U.S., at 266 , 273-274 .

Our decision in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000), confirmed that this principle applies when an agreement thwarts federal law by making arbitration prohibitively expensive. The plaintiff there (seeking relief under the Truth in Lending Act) argued that an arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it "create[d] a risk" that she would have to "bear prohibitive arbitration costs" in the form of high filing and administrative fees. __Id., at 90 (internal quotation marks omitted). We rejected that contention, but not because we doubted that such fees could prevent the effective vindication of statutory rights. To the contrary, we invoked our rule from _Mitsubishi[****9]_ , making clear that it applied to the case before us. See 538 U.S., at 90 . Indeed, we added a burden of proof: "[W]here, as here," we held, a party asserting a federal right "seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs." __Id., at 92 . Randolph, we found, had failed to [***431] meet that burden: The evidence she offered was "too speculative." __Id., at 91 . But even as we dismissed Randolph's suit, we reminded courts to protect against arbitration agreements that make federal claims too costly to bring.

Applied as our precedents direct, the effective-vindication rule furthers the purposes not just of laws like the Sherman Act, but of the FAA itself. That statute reflects a federal [*244] policy favoring actual arbitration-that is, arbitration as a streamlined "method of resolving disputes," not as a foolproof way of killing off valid claims. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 , 481 (1989). Put otherwise: What the FAA prefers to litigation is arbitration, not _de facto_ immunity. The effective-vindication rule furthers the statute's goals by ensuring that arbitration remains a real, not faux, method of dispute resolution. With the rule, companies have good reason to adopt arbitral procedures that facilitate efficient and accurate handling of complaints. Without it, companies have every incentive to draft their agreements to extract backdoor waivers of statutory rights, making arbitration unavailable or pointless. So down one road: More arbitration, better enforcement of federal statutes. And down the other: Less arbitration, poorer enforcement of federal statutes. Which would you prefer? Or still more aptly: Which do you think Congress would?

The answer becomes all the more obvious given the limits we have placed on the rule, which ensure that it does not diminish arbitration's benefits. The rule comes into play only when an agreement "operate[s] ... as a prospective waiver"-that is, forecloses (not diminishes) a plaintiff 's opportunity to gain relief for a statutory violation. _Mitsubishi_, 473 U.S., at 637 , n. 19. So, for example, _Randolph_ assessed whether fees in arbitration would be "prohibitive" (not high, excessive, or extravagant). 531 U.S., at 90 . Moreover, the plaintiff must make that showing through concrete proof: "[S]peculative" risks, "unfounded assumptions," and "unsupported statements" will not suffice. __Id., at 90-91 , and n. 6. With the inquiry that confined and the evidentiary requirements that high, courts have had no trouble assessing the matters the rule makes relevant. And for almost three decades, [**2316] courts have followed our edict that arbitration clauses must usually prevail, declining to enforce them in only rare cases. See Brief for United States as _Amicus Curiae_ 26-27. [*245] The effective-vindication rule has thus operated year in and year out without undermining, much less "destroy[ing]," the prospect of speedy dispute resolution that arbitration secures. _Ante_, at 9.

And this is just the kind of case the rule was meant to address. Italian Colors, as I have noted, alleges that Amex [****10] used its market power to impose a tying arrangement in violation of the Sherman Act. The antitrust laws, all parties agree, provide the restaurant with a cause of action and give it the chance to recover treble damages. Here, that would mean Italian Colors could take home up to $38,549. But a problem looms. As this case comes to us, the evidence shows that Italian Colors cannot prevail in arbitration without an economic analysis defining the relevant markets, [***432] establishing Amex's monopoly power, showing anticompetitive effects, and measuring damages. And that expert report would cost between several hundred thousand and one million dollars._¹_ So the expense involved in proving the claim in arbitration is ten times what Italian Colors could hope to gain, even in a best-case scenario. That counts as a "prohibitive" cost, in _Randolph_'s terminology, if anything does. No rational actor would bring a claim worth tens of thousands of dollars if doing so meant incurring costs in the hundreds of thousands. [*246]

An arbitration agreement could manage such a mismatch in many ways, but Amex's disdains them all. As the Court makes clear, the contract expressly prohibits class arbitration. But that is only part of the problem._²_ The agreement also disallows any kind of joinder or consolidation of claims or parties. And more: Its confidentiality provision prevents Italian Colors from informally arranging with other merchants to produce a common expert report. And still more: The agreement precludes any shifting of costs to Amex, even if Italian Colors prevails. And beyond all that: Amex refused to enter into any stipulations that would obviate or mitigate the need for the economic analysis. In short, the agreement as applied in this case cuts off not just class arbitration, but any avenue for sharing, shifting, or shrinking necessary costs. Amex has put Italian Colors to this choice: Spend way, way, way more money than your claim is worth, or relinquish your Sherman Act rights.

So contra the majority, the court below got this case right. Italian Colors proved what the plaintiff in _Randolph_ could not-that a standard-form agreement, taken as a whole, renders arbitration of a claim "prohibitively expensive." 531 U.S., at 92 . [**2317] The restaurant thus established that the contract "operate[s] ... as a prospective waiver," and prevents the "effective[] ... vindicat[ion]" of Sherman Act rights. _Mitsubishi_, 473 U.S., at 637 , and n. 19. I would follow our precedents and decline to compel arbitration.

The majority is quite sure that the effective-vindication rule does not apply here, but has precious little to say about why. It starts by disparaging the rule as having "originated as dictum." _Ante,_ at 6. But it does not rest on that swipe, and for good reason. As I have explained, see _supra,_ at 3-4, [***433] [*247] the rule began as a core part of _Mitsubishi_: We held there that federal statutory claims are subject to arbitration "_so long as_" the claimant "effectively may vindicate its [rights] in the arbitral forum." 473 U.S., at 637 (emphasis added). The rule thus served as an essential condition of the decision's holding._³_ And [****11] in _Randolph_, we provided a standard for applying the rule when a claimant alleges "prohibitive costs" ("Where, as here," etc., see _supra,_ at 5), and we then applied that standard to the parties before us. So whatever else the majority might think of the effective-vindication rule, it is not dictum.

The next paragraph of the Court's decision (the third of Part IV) is the key: It contains almost the whole of the majority's effort to explain why the effective-vindication rule does not stop Amex from compelling arbitration. The majority's first move is to describe _Mitsubishi_ and _Randolph_ as covering only discrete situations: The rule, the majority asserts, applies to arbitration agreements that eliminate the "right to pursue statutory remedies" by "forbidding the assertion" of the right (as addressed in _Mitsubishi_) or imposing filing and administrative fees "so high as to make access to the forum impracticable" (as addressed in _Randolph_). _Ante,_ at 6 (emphasis deleted; internal quotation marks omitted). Those cases are not this case, the majority says: Here, the agreement's provisions went to the possibility of "_proving_ a statutory remedy." _Ante,_ at 7.

But the distinction the majority proffers, which excludes problems of proof, is one _Mitsubishi_ and _Randolph_ (and our [*248] decisions reaffirming them) foreclose. Those decisions establish what in some quarters is known as a principle: When an arbitration agreement prevents the effective vindication of federal rights, a party may go to court. That principle, by its nature, operates in diverse circumstances-not just the ones that happened to come before the Court. See _supra,_ at 3-4. It doubtless covers the baldly exculpatory clause and prohibitive fees that the majority acknowledges would preclude an arbitration agreement's enforcement. But so too it covers the world of other provisions a clever drafter might devise to scuttle even the most meritorious federal claims. Those provisions might deny entry to the forum in the first instance. Or they might deprive the claimant of any remedy. Or they might prevent the claimant from offering the necessary proof to prevail, as in my "no economic testimony" hypothetical-and [**2318] in the actual circumstances of this case. See _supra,_ at 3. The variations matter not at all. Whatever the precise mechanism, each "operate[s] ... as a prospective waiver of a party's [federal] right[s]"-and so confers immunity [***434] on a wrongdoer. _Mitsubishi_, 473 U.S., at 637 , n. 19. And that is what counts under our decisions._⁴_

Nor can the majority escape the principle we have established by observing, as it does at one point, that Amex's agreement merely made arbitration "not worth the expense." _Ante_, at 7. That suggestion, after all, runs smack into _Randolph_, which likewise involved an allegation that arbitration, as specified in a contract, "would be prohibitively [*249] expensive." 531 U.S., at 92 . Our decision there made clear that a provision raising a plaintiff 's costs could foreclose consideration of federal claims, and so run afoul of the effective-vindication rule. The expense at issue in _Randolph_ came from a filing fee [****12] combined with a per-diem payment for the arbitrator. But nothing about those particular costs is distinctive; and indeed, a rule confined to them would be weirdly idiosyncratic. Not surprisingly, then, _Randolph_ gave no hint of distinguishing among the different ways an arbitration agreement can make a claim too costly to bring. Its rationale applies whenever an agreement makes the vindication of federal claims impossibly expensive-whether by imposing fees or proscribing cost-sharing or adopting some other device.

That leaves the three last sentences in the majority's core paragraph. Here, the majority conjures a special reason to exclude "class-action waiver[s]" from the effective-vindication rule's compass. _Ante,_ at 7-8, and n. 4. Rule 23, the majority notes, became law only in 1938-decades after the Sherman Act. The majority's conclusion: If federal law in the interim decades did not eliminate a plaintiff 's rights under that Act, then neither does this agreement.

But that notion, first of all, rests on a false premise: that this case is only about a class-action waiver. See _ante_, at 7, n. 4 (confining the case to that issue). It is not, and indeed could not sensibly be. The effective-vindication rule asks whether an arbitration agreement _as a whole_ precludes a claimant from enforcing federal statutory rights. No single provision is properly viewed in isolation, because an agreement can close off one avenue to pursue a claim while leaving others open. In this case, for example, the agreement could have prohibited class arbitration without offending the effective-vindication rule _if_ it had provided an alternative mechanism to share, shift, or reduce the necessary costs. The agreement's problem is that it bars not just class actions, but also all mechanisms-many existing long before the [*250] Sherman Act, if that matters-for joinder or consolidation of claims, informal coordination among individual claimants, or amelioration of arbitral expenses. See _supra,_ at 7. And contrary [***435] to the majority's assertion, the Second Circuit well understood that point: It considered, for [**2319] example, whether Italian Colors could shift expert expenses to Amex if its claim prevailed (no) or could join with merchants bringing similar claims to produce a common expert report (no again). See 554 F. 3d 300 , 318 (2009). It is only in this Court that the case has become strangely narrow, as the majority stares at a single provision rather than considering, in the way the effective-vindication rule demands, how the entire contract operates._⁵_

In any event, the age of the relevant procedural mechanisms (whether class actions or any other) does not matter, because the effective-vindication rule asks about the world today, not the world as it might have looked when Congress passed a given statute. Whether a particular procedural device preceded or post-dated a particular statute, the question remains the same: Does the arbitration agreement foreclose a party-right now-from effectively vindicating the substantive rights the statute provides? This case exhibits a whole raft of [****13] changes since Congress passed the Sherman Act, affecting both parties to the dispute-not just new procedural rules (like Rule 23), but also new evidentiary requirements ([*251] like the demand here for an expert report) and new contract provisions affecting arbitration (like this agreement's confidentiality clause). But what has stayed the same is this: Congress's intent that antitrust plaintiffs should be able to enforce their rights free of any prior waiver. See _supra,_ at 2-3; _Mitsubishi_, 473 U.S., at 637 , n. 19. The effective-vindication rule carries out that purpose by ensuring that any arbitration agreement operating as such a waiver is unenforceable. And that requires courts to determine in the here and now-rather than in ye olde glory days-whether an agreement's provisions foreclose even meritorious antitrust claims.

Still, the majority takes one last stab: "Truth to tell," it claims, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. ___ (2011), "all but resolves this case." _Ante,_ at 8. In that decision, the majority recounts, this Court held that the FAA preempted a state "law conditioning enforcement of arbitration on the availability of class procedure." _Ibid ._; see 563 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 9). According to the majority, that decision controls here because "[w]e specifically rejected the argument that class arbitration was necessary." _Ante_, at 9.

Where to begin? Well, maybe where I just left off: Italian Colors is not claiming that a class action is necessary-only that it have _some_ means of vindicating a meritorious claim. And as I have shown, non-class options [***436] abound. See _supra,_ at 11. The idea that _AT&T Mobility_ controls here depends entirely on the majority's view that this case is "class action or bust." Were the majority to drop that pretense, it could make no claim for _AT&T Mobility_'s relevance.

And just as this case is not about class actions, _AT&T Mobility_ was not-and [**2320] could not have been-about the effective-vindication rule. Here is a tip-off: _AT&T Mobility_ nowhere cited our effective-vindication precedents. That was so for two reasons. To begin with, the state law in question made class-action waivers unenforceable even when a party _could_ feasibly vindicate her claim in an individual [*252] arbitration. The state rule was designed to preserve the broad-scale "deterrent effects of class actions," not merely to protect a particular plaintiff 's right to assert her own claim. 563 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 3). Indeed, the Court emphasized that the complaint in that case was "most unlikely to go unresolved" because AT&T's agreement contained a host of features ensuring that "aggrieved customers who filed claims would be essentially guaranteed to be made whole." __Id., at ___ (slip op., at 17-18) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). So the Court professed that _AT&T Mobility_ did not implicate the only thing (a party's ability to vindicate a meritorious claim) this case involves.

And if that is not enough, _AT&T Mobility_ involved a _state_ law, and therefore could not possibly implicate the effective-vindication rule. When a state rule allegedly conflicts with the FAA, we apply standard preemption principles, asking whether [****14] the state law frustrates the FAA's purposes and objectives. If the state rule does so-as the Court found in _AT&T Mobility_-the Supremacy Clause requires its invalidation. We have no earthly interest (quite the contrary) in vindicating that law. Our effective-vindication rule comes into play only when the FAA is alleged to conflict with another _federal_ law, like the Sherman Act here. In that all-federal context, one law does not automatically bow to the other, and the effective-vindication rule serves as a way to reconcile any tension between them. Again, then, _AT&T Mobility_ had no occasion to address the issue in this case. The relevant decisions are instead _Mitsubishi_ and _Randolph_.

* * *

The Court today mistakes what this case is about. To a hammer, everything looks like a nail. And to a Court bent on diminishing the usefulness of Rule 23, everything looks like a class action, ready to be dismantled. So the Court does not consider that Amex's agreement bars not just class actions, but "other forms of cost-sharing ... that could provide [*253] effective vindication." _Ante_, at 7, n. 4. In short, the Court does not consider-and does not decide-Italian Colors's (and similarly situated litigants') actual argument about why the effective-vindication rule precludes this agreement's enforcement.

As a result, Amex's contract will succeed in depriving Italian Colors of any effective opportunity to challenge monopolistic conduct allegedly in violation of the Sherman Act. The FAA, the majority says, so requires. Do not be fooled. Only the Court so requires; the FAA was never meant to produce this outcome. The FAA conceived of arbitration as a "method of [***437] _resolving_ disputes"-a way of using tailored and streamlined procedures to facilitate redress of injuries. _Rodriguez de Quijas_, 490 U.S., at 481 (emphasis added). In the hands of today's majority, arbitration threatens to become more nearly the opposite-a mechanism easily made to block the vindication of meritorious federal claims and insulate wrongdoers from liability. The Court thus undermines the FAA no less than it does the Sherman Act and other federal statutes providing rights of action. I respectfully dissent.

question: What was the agreement between American Express, petitioners, a subsidiary and respondents who accept American Express cards?

answer: The agreement requires all their disputes to be resolved by arbitration.

question: What happened when respondents filed a class action against American Express in 2013?

answer: The District Courts dismissed the lawsuits. However, the Second Circuit reversed this decision because of the prohibitive costs respondents will face during arbitration.

question: What is the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) decision on this case?

answer: The FAA ruled that the court does not have to right to invalidate contractual waiver on the grounds that claims exceed potential recovery.

question: What is the Supreme Court's decision on this case?

answer: The Supreme Court overruled the FAA, stating that a contractual waiver of class arbitration is enforceable when the plaintiff's cost of arbitration exceeds the potential recovery.

question: Write a ~5 sentence summary.

answer:
The case between American Express Co. et al _v_. Italian Colors Restaurant et al was based on an agreement between American Express and its client (Italian Colors Restaurant), which states that any dispute must be settled by arbitration.

However, the respondents took America Express to court, where the District Court dismissed the case. However, The Second Circuit reversed the decision.

The Supreme Court upheld the Second Circuit decision, stating that a contractual waiver of class arbitration is enforceable when the plaintiff's cost of arbitration exceeds the potential recovery.


split: train

text:
	It is the same mantra I recited every night in my head. Without fail and without bidding, as soon as I lie my weary head on my pillow those words carry me on to sleep. It seems like my whole life has been lived on those words. Every day is the same drudgery with different scenery. I don’t remember a time it was ever different.

	It’s cold out and I don’t want to leave the covers. Is it because of the cold? Or because of the disgust I have for myself and the world around me. Disgust? Is that the word? I think apathy would be more appropriate. I am apathetic to everything and everyone and yet I am still her, trudging along like a dream. How do I keep going? Because I must.

	I pull myself out of bed- late again. Damn. I wish I cared. All I care about is the minor annoyance my boss will be when I show up 20 minutes late. Maybe one of these days I’ll lose my job because of it, maybe. I go along with the normal morning routine. Brush teeth, wash face, comb hair, dress. There’s no sense of urgency. I’m late, but I won’t change that and it doesn’t matter anyhow.

	After my short commute I show up 15 minutes after I should. No one says a word. They seem to ignore me as a trudge past the cubicle prison to my very own cell. No word from the boss. I guess he’s used to this by now.

	Another day drifts by slowly, like I am on a death bed. I can’t focus, can’t drive myself to do what I need to do. I barely have the motivation to dredge up distractions- youtube videos, reddit, anything to try to take my mind off what’s around me. Lunch rolls by. It’s afternoon already. 4pm. 1 hour left. If I lose my job I’ll lose everything. No food, no house, no video games to take my mind off everything when the work day ends. I get the only motivation I have all day- motivation to do just enough work to skid on by. I spend 60 minutes of the dreaded 540 minute work day actually doing enough to earn my keep. Even that’s not enough. Everyone can see my horrible performance.

	Maybe I should get another job. I’ll be happier at another job. But what if I won’t? What if I’m the problem? I don’t want to deal with new people and learning new things. I won’t be able to if I feel like this. It will worse and I’ll probably get paid less. No, I’ll keep this job as long as I can. I wonder how long that will be…

	5pm! It’s here. I feel a slight elation for the hour. But I haven’t finished up yet. I need to wrap up. 30 more minutes of excruciating pain.

	I’m home. Weighed down from another 9 hour day I want to forget. I open the door and slump in front of my computer. Games. Games will help me forget. I boot up league of legends and the time flies by. With every win I feel like I’ve accomplished something and with every loss I am upset at my incompetence. But for those few hours I’m not here anymore. I’m in another place and I’m happier. Happier than I’ve ever been in the real world. Why can’t it always be like this?

	11pm. I’m fatigued. It’s time for bed. Sometimes I have the energy to wash my face and brush my teeth, other times I don’t even care. As a lie down into bed and cover myself up I hear the familiar words that guide my life and lull me back to sleep.

I have lost my place in this world. I no longer belong. I only exist.

title: SS: "I have lost my place in this world. I no longer belong. I only exist."

question: What does the story say about its setting?

question: What does the story say about the narrator?

answer: The narrator struggles to leave their bed. When they finally do, they end up being late for work. They go to their job where they are unhappy and contemplate whether or not they should quit and by the time they know it, their day was over. They go home and play games then go to bed fatigued.

question: What is the narrator's perspective of themselves?

answer: The narrator goes about their boring day and ends it by playing video games. They believe their directionless lifestyle has left them feeling empty. They no longer have a place in this world, they only exist.

question: What does the story say about the narrator's job?


text:
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question: List all the tutors on the site.

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question: What locations do the tutors seem to be from?

answer: Many are from Kuala Lumpur and Shah Alam. There are also tutors from Petaling and Subang Jaya, Johor Badru, and Penang.


text:
Stardate: no clue. Warp drive is fucked. Life support systems are on life support. Best I can figure, electromagnetic something or other must have flared up. Whatever that means. This area is totally empty of any stars, planets, comets, asteroids, or any other names we've come up with for rocks floating in space. I'm only realizing at this moment what a terrible idea it was of society to start letting dumbasses like me pilot these metal death traps.

Looking out, I can see another ship drifting by and I guess it got hit by the same wave of bullshit. I have to assume the other poor bastard in there is as hopelessly unintelligent as me.
The only plan I've got is to see if I can jump across the void to the other ship. I've got nothing to change my direction once I take that leap. I am not scared, yet, because I have not convinced my brain that this is real. When I was a kid, we hadn't even made it to Mars. And here I am, with a flat tire in as close to nowhere as one can be. There's no way any of this is real.

My mind is racing, and I'm trying to keep it that way. If it settles down, it will start to feel what it has already realized: I'm fucked. I'm thinking back to my younger days playing pool in my friend's basement. I never paid attention in physics or geometry and they say pool is all geometry. I'm not sure if I'm the cue or the cue ball, though. I'm pretty sure that other ship is the pocket. So I guess I'm trying to scratch? The analogy is falling apart. I never played pool by the numbers anyway. Always went by feeling.

I open the hatch and the little air pressure left in the cabin rushes out. I lucked out and the angle to the other ship seems pretty well lined up with the hatch. I'm trying to picture everything in such a way that the leap seems easiest. Only my ship is moving, I decide. The other one is stationary. A metal island in the dark cosmic ocean.

My mind is starting to slow. The reality is starting to take hold. If I don't jump know, I'll be a huddled mess in the corner of my ship until I asphyxiate. I get my mind racing again thinking about the odds that I am even within sight of another ship. It's got to mean something. Maybe I've got a guardian angel that looked away from the controls for a bit and is trying to rectify the situation without giving himself away. No way that's true, I think, but I trick myself into feeling it just enough that I am ready.

I don't think of my wife. I don't think of my kids. There will be plenty of time for those thoughts if I miss. Dammit, I shouldn't have thought that. It's now or never.

I jump.

title: Leap

question: What circumstance is the narrator in?

answer: His starship's systems are dysfunctional, and he's stranded in space. There's a ship in a similar situation, and his only plan is to manage to jump to it.

question: Explain the narrator's plan of escape.

answer: His ship is out of order, but there might be a way to stay alive if he makes contact with the pilot of the other ship. Thus, he intends to jump through space and get in the other ship.

question: What are the chances of the narrator staying alive well after the jump?

answer: Slim. He needs to reach the other ship without any way to change his course during the travel from his ship to the other one. Then, he will need a plan to stay alive in a very similar situation, with the only change being that there might be the company of another pilot.

question: Explain the narrator's analogy about his plan.

answer: He wants to shoot himself to the entry hole of the other ship. He thinks that the other ship is the pocket, and he's either the cue ball or the cue. In that case, putting the cue ball into the pocket is scratching, which is similar to what he intends to do.

question: Write a ~5 sentence summary.

answer: The narrator is stranded in a starship he pilots, its warp drive dysfunctional. The narrator isn't very knowledgeable about space flight or physics, so the best he can say is that electromagnetic something must have flared up. There's another ship in a similar situation floating alongside his. He tries his best to not think about his circumstances, his wife and kids, or whether he can manage the jump to the other ship. He opens the airlock and jumps.


text:
Everyone despises me. Me being who I've always wanted to be is suddenly about to come true. With the razor in my hand, who needs a diploma to do surgery. Not me, oh no. Because when I'm finished, a true work of art will stand before you. Something that holds too much beauty for some guy to hold.

I will over power everyone in such a way that they will wish to be as pretty. Boys will be put into a hold so dangerous that they will wish they never laid an eye on me. Pretty girls will be screaming their last breath away by the foot of my heel pushing into their ribs. Ugly girls will be my new samples of my work.

Everyone will be tortured. They will feel how it is to be me. Or the now used to be me.

Whether they deserve to or not. I will be the queen of something much worse than a nuclear explosion or hanging flesh eating alive another. They will be pleading on their knees for forgiveness, help, something else besides death. But no, no I will not look past their pity eyes, because no one did for me.

So, I take this razor and stare into the mirror. My own black sharpie marks scatter around my body.

Chop off that fat there.

Scratch at that mole there.

Stitch up the heart of mine.

Oh, they don't even know what they have coming. Because when I'm done, the world will be silent. Everyone will obey me, get down to their knees, and bow to their queen.

And if I die, then I died with a dream. Died with the dream coming true.

title: She wanted to be pretty; so she did.

question: What is the narrator describing doing?

answer: Slicing herself up with a straight razor to be more "perfect."

question: Is the narrator committing suicide?

answer: She's not against dying while in the pursuit of her dreams coming true - a more perfect body.

question: What does she want for others?

answer: To feel her pain.

question: Is the narrator depressed?

answer: Or has body dysmorphia, or something. She's willing to literally and physically hurt herself to relive her "pain."

question: Write a ~3 sentence summary.

answer: The narrator is overwhelmed with feelings of being despised for their imperfect body. She marks up her body with a sharpie and prepares to make cutting alterations with a razor in order to look stunningly beautiful, to make others feel the pain she's felt. If she dies, she dies pursuing her dream.


text:
Time for some shit you don't want to hear.

We've been so busy playing defense I neglected to tell you everything, and I'm sorry for that but if you knew everything then you might not have tried anything I suggested.

And I want you to survive.

But now, you've tried these things and perhaps after trial and error you've got some of them to work better then others. So we kind of have a little trust going on.

You've accepted that the repeating demon voices in your head originated from some brain wave radio machine, and after accepting that was able to prevent, maybe even stop that loop entirely. You've found your calm little circle that helps you identify outside influences and your decision making process has become significantly easier. We did all that without even thinking about why we where doing it, like a thirsty nomad digging in the desert for water without understanding why the water table is underground just knowing the water will be there.

So why? Why did we go through all that?

Here's the fact.

If it's technological, that means someone has to work a machine. Most likely a team of people, much in the same way a team of people spies on a foreign country. Previously we couldn't address our assailants, as they where a random loop broadcast over the radio waves instigated by some anonymous hand. No, we couldn't address the loop because we thought the loop ourselves, or another sentience, but a loop will never address you back you see. But we can talk to the hand, oh yes we can.

The new dialogues happening in your head that flow so smoothly as though you where talking to yourself, they originate from the same kind of machine. Only now that machine has a sentient operator. A human being say, recently graduated from some college somewhere, hired on to defend the state against it's enemies, recruited to conduct R&D research on possible future weapons and population controls. He is part of an organization, a cog in a machine. He has superiors and possibly subordinates, but that voice trying to destroy you or manipulate you into things you're unsure of is not the devil or god. It is a man behind a machine.

And he feels as immune to you as drone pilot operators feel immune from retaliation from the people they target in countries so far away.

He has probably been told that for whatever reason you deserve what is happening to you, so he is relentless in his attempts. He is part of a organizational machine and probably worked hard his whole life to be doing what he's doing, going through all sorts of conditioning and screening to be sure he is capable of driving a fellow human being mad and possibly to suicide. We should not feel bad for this man. He has wanted this his whole life and you, you are the unfortunate victim of his desires and the desires of his superiors.

They know the loops can be enough for suicide if not caught in time and they know that this new technique is even more lethal.

I would go into why, but you already know why. No one believes you but maybe you.. and apparently this anonymous writer on the internet. You're the only one who can hear them and if they're past the loops that means they're researching you. They're learning about you. They go through your books, your old school papers, your religious beliefs. They'll watch you at work if possible and conduct passive to aggressive interviews about you with your friends and family. Everything you have ever known or ever believed will be turned upside down and used against you.

Seriously though, calm your tits. You've made it this far, you've practically got this in the bag. You've been working out.

Time to shake shit up.

So, here is this person, sitting comfortably in his office over some elaborate machine, probably watching you on some form of viewing device. He chuckles to himself when he gets you to fail, or stumble, or be awkward in conversation. He probably gets raises and promotions if you collapse and are institutionalized or kill yourself. He's probably getting paid by your tax dollars. If he's good at it he probably has a team he directs, full of young trainees longing for his status within their organization.

He is aware of technologies the commercial public may never see. He is aware of knowledges you will never learn outside his organization and he is privy to secrets presidents and emperors are ignorant of. He is confident and assured in his position. He has (at this point) watched and reviewed you using the bathroom, taking a shower, masturbating, flirting, crying, laughing, etc. and despite his knowledge of your life, probably even better than you remember, he doesn't see a beautiful individual desperately trying to find some kind of happiness in this world.

He sees a disgusting train-wreck of an unambitious loser barely plodding his way through life. You will never be as important as he is. He is so clearly your superior. It doesn't matter if you're a doctor, a president, or a heroin junkie. He, with the help of his cameras and investigations and the use of his machine to push you around so easily, how weak you are to his device, to him. He has put you in a jail no one else can see. He has been silently beating you in a corner and over time you will act like someone who has been repeatedly abused. Therapists will divulge false or 'hidden' memories as an explanation and that may calm you for awhile, but he will persevere in his purpose.

And so, he sits in his comfortable office, this anonymous untraceable (or so he thinks) assassin, and reviews your documentation and personality profile seeking the next new thing to wear you out with. Perhaps he puts his headset on so he can hear your superficial inner voice, your cognitive voice, and engage in dialogue with it as though he were you. He leans over his microphone and engages directly with your mind, assured that he is unreachable and unknown.

But that machine. That machine that is your curse and the cause of your despair has also been your exercise bike. You've been running around the world while this man has been flown in private jets and been driven by drivers in fancy cars.

This man has no idea how big he has made you.

He thinks he needs the machine, that the machine is the only way. You and I know better. Well, I do, you're about to.

Your going to stand at the edge of your circle, your gonna look at that light, or hear his voice, and your going to travel back with it, right to his machine. And from his machine your going to step right on top of his circle, and you going to say "Hello, who are you? Please stop what your doing."

And he's going to hear you.

And he's going to lose his mind.

title: This is Not a Guide for Beginners (Part 4)

question: Describe what the voices in "your" head say.

answer: The voices are a loop that repeat in order to cause "you" to fail. The narration does not specifically state what it is that the voices say.

question: Describe the relationship between "you" and the man behind the machine.

answer: The man knows everything about "you" as he is able to constantly observe you. He is transmitting these voices into your head in order to attempt to drive you mad and possibly make you commit suicide.

question: Explain the nature of the loop.

answer: The loop consists of the repeating voices that are transmitted into "your" head by the man behind the machine.

question: What is the function of the machine?

answer: The machine allows the man to transmit the looping voices directly into "your" head.

question: Why does the narrator believe the man behind the machine will lose his mind?

answer: Because the protagonist ("you") is going to communicate with the man, a feat which the man believed to have been impossible.

question: Write a ~3 sentence summary.

answer: The narrator informs the protagonist ("you") that the thoughts being transmitted into their head are being sent by a man behind a machine. The man's task is to drive the protagonist inside, possibly toward suicide. But the protagonist has now learned how to communicate with the man behind the machine, and when the man hears them, it is going to drive him mad.


text:
“DUMB HEAD” is a song recorded by American girl-pop performer Ginny Arnell. It was written by David Hess and Camille Monte, arranged by Al Gorgoni, produced by Jim Vienneau, and released in November 1963.[1] The single was a minor hit, entering the _Billboard_ Hot 100,[2] and was featured on her debut full-length LP, _Meet Ginny Arnell_.[3] British girl group The Sharades later recorded the song.[4]

Lyrical composition

Lyrically, “Dumb Head” tells the story of a girl who rejected a boy and now regrets it; she calls herself, among other self-demeaning names, a “dumb head” and “a stupid little girl.”[5] The song has an irregular phrase rhythm, meaning that Arnell varies the length and rhythm of her lines.[6]

Recording

“Dumb Head” was Arnell's fifth solo single, released over three years after her solo debut, and her second for MGM Records, following “Trouble's Back In Town”. Her earlier records had been commercial failures, never charting and receiving little press.[7] The record company teamed her with arranger Al Gorgoni and producer Jim Vienneau. Arnell initially disliked the song “Dumb Head”, later saying in an interview:

  I said to my manager, “I'm not so sure about this song.” I didn't like calling myself a dumb head, especially as I had just graduated high school with high honours. How could I call myself dumb and feel good about it? But when we recorded it, with the kazoos in the background and all, it was fun. It came out really good...[8]

As well as kazoos, the song features a saxophone and organ,[9] and an orchestra arranged by Gorgoni.[10] She also recorded a version of “Dumb Head” in Japanese.[11] Arnell said:

  The record was a hit over in Asia and they asked me if I would be nice enough to record the song in Japanese for them. I thought “What?!” But MGM was very good about sending a tutor [who] taught me how to sing it phonetically. It was very exciting and it came out OK. I don't know if it's word-for-word as the American version, but it sure is nice to listen to...[12]

Release and promotion

The song was released as a 7" single, which included the B-side “How Many Times Can One Heart Break?”[13] MGM Records promoted “Dumb Head,” among other new releases, in a full-page advertisement placed in the October 26, 1963 edition of Billboard Magazine.[14] Arnell toured to promote the record, and appeared on _American Bandstand_ to lip-sync to the track. The producers mistakenly started playing Bobby Rydell's “Wild One” instead of “Dumb Head,”[15] but the mistake was soon corrected and, though Arnell was embarrassed, she completed the appearance.[16] Arnell also embarked on several cross-country tours, spurred on by the song's popularity.[17]

Critical reception

In a 1964 review of “Meet Ginny Arnell,” _Billboard_ magazine singled out “Dumb Head” as “a hefty chart entry,” going on to give the album a “Pop Special Merit” award designation.[18]

The song is highly regarded retrospectively by some music critics, though others are more skeptical of the song. Allmusic's Dave Thompson praised the song's instrumentation and Arnell's vocal performance, particularly the “duh-di-duh-di-duh” chorus. He went on to conclude that “The real dumbheads [...] were the record buying public of 1963, who could push this amazing record no higher than #50 on the US chart.”[19] _Vice_'s Mish Way spoke negatively of Arnell's version, however, commenting that when “Arnell sings this song the lyrics seem pathetic and forced.”[20] Trevor Tolliver, in his book _You Don't Own Me: The Life and Times of Lesley Gore_, called the song “atrocious” and the lyrics “sickening.”[21]

Commercial performance

The song reached number 50 on the _Billboard_ Hot 100, spending a total of 12 weeks on the chart.[22] It remains Arnell's only Hot 100 entry, though one of her subsequent singles, “I Wish I Knew What Dress to Wear,” managed to reach number 30 on the Bubbling Under Hot 100 Singles chart.[23] “Dumb Head” also reached number 20 on _Cashbox_{{'}}s “Looking Ahead” chart dated November 16, 1963,[24] and number 3 on the _Chicago Top 40_.[25]

+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| Chart (1963)                      | Peak                              |
|                                   | position                          |
+===================================+===================================+
| _Cashbox_ Looking Ahead[26]       | 20                                |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| Chicago Top 40[27]                | 3                                 |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| US _Billboard_ Hot 100[28]        | 50                                |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+

Legacy and cover versions

[Pop musician Charli XCX (above) has cited “Dumb Head” as an influence when recording _Sucker_, her second album] The song continues to be regarded by some critics as a girl-pop classic,[29][30] though others continue to view it as a sub-par girl pop song.[31][32] It was included on several girl-pop compilations, including _Growin' Up Too Fast: The Girl Group Anthology_ (1996), _I Wish I Were a Princess: The Great Lost Female Teen Idols_ (1997), and _Early Girls, Vol. 3_ (2000).[33] Charli XCX cited the song as an influence when recording her _Sucker_ album.[34] According to _Goldmine Standard Catalog of American Records 1948-1991_, the 7" release of “Dumb Head” is now worth $12.[35]

The song was rerecorded by The Sharades and produced by Joe Meek[36] and released in the UK in January 1964.[37][38] Their cover is highly regarded retrospectively, with many critics noting the song as being better than Arnell's version. _Vice_'s Mish Way, while skeptical of Arnell's recording, praised The Sharades' version, calling it “the cheekiest slumber party anthem that ever existed.”[39] _Dazed_ felt that The Sharades' version was a “classic,” calling the song “eerie yet compelling with a killer melody.”[40] Pitchfork called Meek's production “even more unsettled” than the original.[41] The song has also been covered by rock group Primetime;[42] their version was featured on the compilation album “Typical Girls.”[43]

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[11] “Talking with Ginny Arnell”, Rare Rockin' Records, 15 March 2010. Retrieved 8 September 2014

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title: Dumb Head

question: Who recorded 'Dumb Head'?

answer: It was originally recorded by American singer Ginny Arnell, and by the British girl group Sharades a year later.

question: Which instruments are featured?

answer: Kazoos, saxophone, organ, and an orchestra.

question: What year was 'Dumb Head' first released?

answer: 1963

question: What was the highest position on the charts reached by the song?

answer: Number 50

question: What genre is the song?

answer: Pop, the sub-genre girl-pop.

question: Write a ~1 sentence summary.

answer: 'Dumb Head' is a 1963 pop song originally recorded by Ginny Arnell that peaked at #50 on the US charts.


text:
The woman screamed. It was a blood curdling scream. Any sane person would have felt such empathy they would have experienced the same terror she was feeling now. But Mr. Black was not a sane man. Mr. Black simply continued to prepare his little "toys."

The woman was going to be his newest playmate for these toys. Tonight was a special night for Mr. Black; it marked a special date. A date when it all began for him; his genesis, his awakening. He felt a slight shiver of an almost sexual nature slither up his back.

He finished sharpening his final knife. Mr. Black turned the surgical table back around with him, now facing the once pretty-now terribly disheveled redhead. He had her strapped down to the surgical table tightly with duct tape and leather. The woman was no longer screaming. Instead she was pleading between hysterical gasps. Fruitless pleading. Before he killed her, Mr. Black said only one thing: "The cocoon has been breached. Metamorphosis begins again." And then there was only blood.

Ok so I know what you're all thinking. Note that is only the prologue chapter for a series of mysteries about a master thief who is brought in by the FBI to investigate a series of bizarre murders, robberies, and disappearances. Mr. Black is the first main villain, and I want him to be one twisted mother fucker. Let me know what you all think, and if reddit approves, I'll put up part 2. of the Mr. Black mysteries.

title: A Preview for a series of mysteries I'm doing. Lemme know if you like the villain and want more!

question: What is Mr. Black doing to the woman?

answer: Mr. Black tortures the woman and then kills her.

question: What is Mr. Black preparing?

answer: Mr. Black is preparing his knives.

question: Why is tonight a special night for Mr. Black?

answer: Tonight is the anniversary of Mr. Black's awakening.

question: Does Mr. Black kill the woman?

answer: Yes Mr. Black kills the woman.

question: Write a ~2 sentence summary.

answer: Mr. Black has a tied up woman and has been torturing her. Tonight is a special occasion for Mr. Black, and he kills her.


text:
is a railway station on the Amagi Line located in Kiyama, Saga, Japan. It is operated by the Amagi Railway, a third sector public-private partnership corporation.[1]

Lines

The station is served by the Amagi Railway Amagi Line and is located 1.3 km from the start of the line at .[2] All Amagi Line trains stop at the station.[3]

Layout

The station consists of a side platform serving a single track at grade. There is no station building but the platform is sheltered as it is located under an expressway overpass. Access to the platform is by means of a flight of steps or a ramp.[4][5][6]

Platforms

Adjacent stations

History

Amagi Railway opened the station on 1 November 1987 as an added station on the existing Amagi Line track.[7]

Surrounding area

-   Coca-Cola West Japan
-   Toyo Seikan

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title: Tateno Station (Saga)

question: What line is Tateno Station located on?

answer: Tateno Station is on the Amagi Line.

question: What city is Tateno Station in?

answer: Tateno Station is in Kiyama, Saga, Japan.

question: How far is Tateno Station from the start of the line?

answer: Tateno Station is 1.3 km from the start of the line.

question: When was Tateno Station opened?

answer: Tateno Station opened on November 1st, 1987.

question: What company operates Tateno Station?

answer: The Amagi Railway operates Tateno Station.

question: Write a ~2 sentence summary.

answer: Tateno Station is a station in Kiyama, Saga, Japan. It is operated by the Amagi Railway, and was opened in 1987.


text:
BERLIN (Reuters) - The pilots of an Air Berlin AB1.DE flight that performed a fly-past during the insolvent carrier's last long-haul flight to its hub in Duesseldorf have been suspended, the airline said on Wednesday.

When coming into land from Miami on Monday morning, the A330 jet flew low across the runway, then pulled up and banked sharply to the left before landing on its second approach.

Pilots are trained in such “go-around” procedures for aborted landings, but the manoeuvre was unusual and the German aviation authorities are investigating.

“In aviation, safety always comes first. We are taking the incident very seriously,” an Air Berlin spokesman said.

The Air Berlin pilot had requested permission from the tower to make a left turn should a go-around be necessary.

“We wanted to make a mark, a dignified and emotional goodbye,” the Air Berlin pilot was quoted as saying by German broadcaster ZDF. His identity was not given.

Another pilot for a different carrier told Reuters that a go-around should be performed only for operational or safety reasons. “Electing to do one if it is known not to be required adds an unnecessary risk,” he said.

Several videos of the incident can be viewed online. In one, control tower staff can be heard exclaiming as the plane flies past, with one person saying: “We are all in awe.”

The Air Berlin spokesman said the videos raised questions that had to be answered as part of the investigation.

Air Berlin filed for insolvency on Aug. 15 and Lufthansa LHAG.DE has signed a deal to buy large parts of its operations.

The airline will fly its final short-haul flights under the Air Berlin brand at the end of this month.

Reporting by Klaus Lauer and Victoria Bryan; Editing by Douglas Busvine and David Goodman

for-phone-onlyfor-tablet-portrait-upfor-tablet-landscape-upfor-desktop-upfor-wide-desktop-up

question: What is being transported on the carriers?

answer: That information can't be found.

question: Explain what a "go-around" is.

answer: A procedure for aborted landings in which a pilot flies a jet low across a runway but doesn't land, pulling back up instead.

question: What is the incident being discussed?

answer: An aborted landing when the pilots of an Air Berlin flight performed a "go-around" maneuver in order to make a dignified and emotional goodbye for their carrier's last long-haul flight.

question: Where did the incident take place?

answer: Duesseldorf

question: What is the name of the pilot involved in the incident?

answer: That information can't be found.

question: Write a ~4 sentence summary.

answer: Two pilots have been suspended after performing a go-around maneuver when landing an Air Berlin carrier in Duesseldorf. The pilots wanted to give a showy goodbye for their carrier's last long-haul flight. The maneuver consisted of flying low across the runway and then pulling up and banking sharply left before coming on for a second landing. Such maneuvers are typically only used for safety reasons and are risky if unnecessary.


text:
I can’t keep living like this. And it’s not your fault—it’s mine. I’m living for you when I should be living for myself, for evenings with friends and holidays with family. Because there isn’t a we. I have to live my own life.

And it isn’t you. I’ve been living in a fantasy, that’s the problem, a fantasy of you and me. I keep thinking that one day you’ll wake up and see me waiting here for you and everything will be like it’s supposed to. You’ll say hi and I’ll say hi and you’ll run your hand through your hair and the spikes will flip back up and I’ll laugh cause it’s cute and you’ll tell me I have a nice smile cause you like the way I squint and my freckles squish around my eyes. We’ll go to the docks, like we always do, and I’ll say the sea smells nice and you’ll say it looks a bit green like its sick and I’ll say that’s the way it’s supposed to look cause this isn’t Hawaii and you’ll say well it doesn’t look good for swimming and I’ll tell you of course it’s good for swimming and we should go sometime and you’ll promise we will someday. Someday isn’t going to come though. You’ll never get to read the notes or see the orange roses with the peeling petals I bought you. I wrote them every day, you know, little haikus and couplets. I thought you’d like that. They’re all stacked on the nightstand under the roses with wilting petals.

I guess we’re just not meant to be. I was so sure we were, yet here we are. Here I am, spilling my guts. Honestly, I can’t stand that we aren’t meant to be. It’s like losing faith. But I guess I have to let go of that the way I have to let go of you. You know, every day I dream about you and me. And you and me don’t exist. At least, not like that. I have to shake that out of my head. So it’s me. It’s my problem.

I can’t forget that time we stayed on the phone till two in the morning, just talking, and the way you laughed at my crappy jokes. That was wonderful. I won’t forget that. I was the most in love with you in those moments. Those were the moments you could have asked me to do anything for you and I would have said yes without hesitation. I was too afraid to tell you this before, but you left me breathless. I should have told you sooner. I guess I’m telling you now, though, and that must count for something. But I can’t help but feel like it’s too late. It’s so hard to find that place between too soon and too late. I’m not sure it exists, really, if there’s a right time to say I love you. I haven’t found it anyway. I know this is terrible timing but I have to tell you that I love you.

But I have to stop thinking about it, because it won’t bring you to me. So I’m going to try to forget how it felt when you smiled at me and how it felt when we spoke in unison. I have to move on, even if it’s without you, even if it hurts. I have to move on.

I’m sorry I’m telling you all this, but I feel like I should explain myself. I need to tell you why I can’t see you anymore. We’ll meet again someday, I’m sure, but at least for now I need to let you go. I don’t know if I can forgive myself for letting you go, but I have to try to live my own life. I hope you can forgive me.

I love you, but it’s not enough. Sometimes love doesn’t conquer. Sometimes it dies. And I’m going to let it, because we can’t save it. I can’t save it. So I’m going to let them unplug you now. They said you’ll stop breathing and your heart will stop beating and it will be slow, but you won’t feel a thing. I’m glad. I wonder if you can even feel this right now. If you can feel me leaving you. Well, in case you can, here’s the ring. I can’t keep it. Not if I’m going to keep going. Not if I’m going to live.

I’ve stayed with you through everything—rich and poor, sickness and health—but I can’t watch you die. I’m not going to stay, so this is goodbye. See you later, love.

title: Halcyon

question: What does the story say about the narrator's letter?

answer: The narrator writes a letter to a dying person. They say they have to live their own life. They live in a fantasy that one day everything will be like it’s supposed to be. The author can't forget the times they spent together. The author says they have has to let their love go. So they will let them unplug the person now.

question: What does the story say about what happened to the dying person?


text:
She knew it was coming. She saw it coming. For three months, she held onto that bright purple monkey that he had gotten her for her birthday and waited. Why had he gotten her a purple monkey anyway? She hated the color purple.

The really sad thing was, she felt almost relieved. And she was disgusted with herself for that.

They had met in a book club meeting, of all places. Freshman year of high school, she walked into the library, still painfully shy, and he was the first one who said hi to her. There were only ten people in the club, and she slowly relaxed around them. They argued over their favorite novels, had contests to see who could read the next assigned book the fastest and made up a secret handshake that, when they tried to perform it in the hallways between classes, always ended in loud laughter.

He had been in three of her classes, which she had never noticed before, and they started hanging out more. When he asked her out, she was so excited, and terrified. She had never had a boyfriend before. Was she supposed to act different around him now? Was she supposed to stop hanging out with him as much? How many texts a day were too many? She didn't worry for too long. He was just as nervous as she was. They spent almost every moment together, those first two years.

Then junior year rolled around and he became distant. He tried to make an effort to stay cheerful around her, but she had known him long enough to see that he was unhappy. She tried talking to him, but he would shake his head and turn away and she didn't push.

She had wondered if he was going to break up with her, and cried. One night, while they were watching a movie together, she turned and looked at him, her eyes filling with angry tears and demanded that he just do it already. She couldn't handle this anymore.

He hugged her, squeezed her as tight as he could, and said that he wasn't going to break up with her. He loved her. He wanted to spend the rest of his life with her. But the rest of his life was three months, maybe four.

They had cried together, and talked, and cried some more. They spent two days apart, because she didn't know how to handle it. But she decided that she would keep him happy for the next three months. He would never have to worry about her leaving him.

Those three months were the worst. He got weaker. He got more emotional. He would lash out for no apparent reason and once, when she told him to relax, he hit her in the face. She was more angry than hurt. "Just because you're dying doesn't mean you get to hit your fucking girlfriend!" She had left, and he called her that night, sobbing and apologizing. She went back to his house and spent the night lying next to him in bed, unable to sleep, listening to his mom cry in the living room.

The phone rang. She answered it on the third ring.

"He wants to see you."

She was silent for a few moments. "I can't. I can't do that."

"Stop being selfish. I don't care if it scars you for life, get your ass to the hospital. For some reason, my boy wants to see you before he dies and you'd better fucking do what he wants."

She hung up and got out of bed. She brushed her hair and put it up, remembering that he always said she looked cute with a ponytail. She put on the shirt he liked the most and a pair of jeans that he had doodled on one day in book club. She drove to the hospital slowly and carefully, parked in the farthest spot from the door. It was windy out, and smelled like it was about to rain. The woman at the front desk directed her to the right room and she went, trying to get lost along the way. It didn't work. The building was too small.

She opened the door marked 318 and everyone in the room turned to stare at her. His mother and father were there. His mother glared at her, but his father smiled. His older brother was there, sitting in the only chair, looking exhausted. And there he was, sitting up in bed, grinning at her.

His father ushered everyone else out of the room to give them privacy. As the door closed, she perched on the side of the hospital bed and took his hand.

"Hey."

He kissed her hand and she smiled. "Hi. I'm glad you came."

"Of course I came." She felt like crying, but refused to. He didn't need that. "This is a much better reason to put off studying for finals."

He laughed, but it sounded off. "You know, I was always amazed that you stuck around. After everything, you're still here. That means the world to me. I love you."

"I love you too." The lie tasted bitter, but she ignored it. They said nothing else to each other. His family returned and she stayed where she was, holding his hand, until he finally closed his eyes and went.

She felt suddenly as if someone had reached into her chest and pricked her heart, letting the blood drain out until it shriveled and died. She left the hospital. She attended the funeral. She finished high school and moved to another state. She went to college, tried to make new friends and have new relationships. She left college, found an okay job, and started dating her next door neighbor. He was an alcoholic, which she didn't mind. He hit her sometimes. She just covered it up with make-up and he never remembered the next morning. He proposed to her and she agreed. They had three children and she quit her job.

She wasn't happy. She hated the children. She hated her husband. She blamed it all on him, the first boy she had ever loved, who had promised her so much and then left her. She was heartless and unlovable because of him. She was depressed because of him. She wished she hadn't lied to him. He should have died knowing that she didn't love him anymore.

She sent the kids off to school, kissed her husband before he left for work, wrote a note and stuck it on her pillow, and decided to go for a walk. She kept walking, until she was so sore that she had to stop. She sat down on the side of a road she didn't recognize and smiled to herself, thinking that she had finally managed to get lost.

title: Lost

question: Why does the narrator's first boyfriend act distant?

answer: He's about to die and probably has no idea how to talk about it. The anxiety and worry of it could easily make someone detached from their daily life.

question: Why does the narrator anticipate that her boyfriend will leave him instead of the truth - that he's dying?

answer: It's very unlikely that people die naturally during high school. It's a lot more probable that a boyfriend acting distant is thinking of breaking up instead of dying.

question: Explain the reticence of the narrator to visit her boyfriend on his deathbed.

answer: She falls out of love during their last months due to her boyfriend's emotionally and physically problematic and at times abusive behavior.

question: Why does the narrator blame her first boyfriend for everything she lives through after?

answer: She tolerates his emotionally problematic behavior and even forgives him after he hits her once. His mother seems to be bullying her into being a "proper supportive girlfriend". When he dies, she's affected heavily after dating him for years. It's probably that she ignores the abusive behavior of her eventual husband because she internalized the trauma she went through with her first boyfriend. She seems unable to unpack all this. Instead, she blames her first boyfriend.

question: Write a ~9 sentence summary.

answer: The narrator meets her first boyfriend in her junior year of high school. They start spending time together, eventually becoming a couple. After two years, he starts acting distant. She confronts him about it and learns that he will die in a few months. Toward the end, she feels out of love with him but sticks with him for the rest of his life despite wanting to just get lost to avoid seeing him on the day he dies. When he dies, something in her heart gives out too. She eventually dates another guy, who's physically abusive, but she ignores it. She ends up married with three kids, and unhappy. One day, she goes out for a walk and finally manages to get lost.